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A MAN AND HIS NAME.
From the days of the Hebrews to the present day, the name
has been regarded as a man's most characteristic possession and
as that which differentiates him from all other persons and enables
his fellowmen to know him. 1 It might seem, at first sight, that a
man's right to use it is indefeasable in all cases, and it is usually
held that the very use of it shows an intent not to deceive. 2 But
even this peculiar possession cannot be used, so as to palm off
one man's goods as those of another,8 and the possession of a
name the same as or similar to that of another tradesman I may
impose a- peculiar responsibility upon one to see that he does not
deceive the public and commit a fraud upon his neighbor. The use
of one's own name may be one of those accumulated resemblances
which amount to dressing 'up goods.5 One man cannot have ex-
clusive right to the use of his name, as against another person
z. Interesting magazine articles on the subject are found in 8 AIb. L. J.
ror and 8 Alb. L. J. 155, 24 Sol J., 605, 627, 647, 660. Hembold v. Hembold.
53 How. Pr. 453.
2. Lewis v. Klafjroth, xx V. L. R. 214; Parsons v'. Gillesfiie, 17 N. S.
W. Rep. Eq. 227; Johnson v. Parr, Russ. Eq..Dee. 98.
3. Goodyear v. Goodyear. 45 Off. Ga-. 122 (Sup. Ct.).
4. An early case (1824) is Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541. See Christie v.
Christie, 42 L. J. Ch. 26r, 544; Baker v. Baker, 78 Off. Gaz. 1427; Baker v.
Baker, 87 Fed. 209; Allegretti'. Allegretti, 177 Ill. 129; Canada Pub. Co.
v'. Gage, xi Ont. A. R. 402 on app. ix Can. S. C. R. 3o6; Garrett v. Gar-
rett, 79 Off. Gaz. x68x; Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84.
s. Holloway v. Holloway, 13 Beav. 2og; Taylor v. Taylor, 23 Eng. L.
& Eq. R. 28!.
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of the same name, 6 unless the latter's use is calculated to deceive
and some contract relation, or other estoppel, has deprived the latter
of what would be -otherwise his right. If the name is honestly
used,7 it may be hurtful to the trade of another which has begun
earlier than the trade of the user of the name, and yet that hurt
will be damnum absque injuria. s The tradesman is "no more lia-
ble for the incidental damage he may do a rival in trade than
he would be for injury to his neighbor's property, by the smoke
issuing from his chimney." Without fraud or express agree-
ment, any one may use his name as he will,' for qui jure sua
utitur nullum damnum facit. He must not, of course, resort to
any artifice calculated to mislead as to the identity of the business,
or article produced, 10 and thus work injury, beyond what results
from the mere similarity of names. It has been held that the
courts will not presume anything in favor of the person demanding
relief from the competition of a man bearing the same name."'
"The manner of using the name is all that would be enjoined, not
the simple use of it, for every man has the absolute right to use
his own name in his business, even though he may thereby inter-
fere with or injure the business of another person bearing the
same name, provided he does not resort to any artifice, or contriv-
ance, for the purpose of producing the impression that the estab-
lishments are identical, or do anything calculated to mislead."1 2
"Neither s authority nor reason are in support of the doctrine
that the fair honest use of a name can be enjoined, when it is
6. legeman v. Hegeman, 8 Daly z; Gilman v. Hunnewell, X22 Mass.
139; Wolfe v. Burke, 7 Lansing xx; Caswell v. Hazard, 121 N. Y. 481, 50
Hun 230; Landreth v,. Landreth, 29 Off. Gaz. 1131; Scott z'. Scott, 58 N. Y.
Super, Ct. 380; Marshall v. Pinkkam, 52 Wis. 572; De Long v. De Long,
39 N. Y. Supp. 903, 74 Off. Gaz. 80g, 8x; Chickering v. Chickering, x2o Fed.
69; Richmond v,. Richmond, 52 Off. Gaz. 306.
7. Higgins v. Higgins, r44 N. Y. 462.
8. Brown v. Meyer, (Sup. Ct.) 55 Off. Gaz. 287.
9. Knoedler v. Glaenzer, 47 Fed. 465, 55 Fed. 895.
1o. Wolmershausen v. Wolmershausen, (1892) W. N. 87; Newman v.
Newman, cited in 9 Ch. D. 56o; Peck v,. Peck, 113 Fed. 291; Chivers v. Chiv-
ers, 17 R. P. C. 42o; Royal Co. v. Royal, 122 Fed. 3371 Russia Cement Co. 7,.
Le Page, 44 Off. Gaz. 823, 5x Fed. 94I.
ii. Cutter v. Gudebrod, 55 N. Y. Supp. 298. See Dewar v. Dewar, 17
R. P. C. 341 (Scotch). See Hazleton v. Hazleton, 137 Ill. 231, 142 II. 494.
12. Meneeley v. Aeneeley, Y Hun 367, 62 N. Y. 427; England . A Y.
Pub. Co., 8 Daly 375; Emjfloyer's Corp. v. Embloyer's Co., 24 Abb. N. C. 368.
Allegretti v. Keller, 8s Fed. 643; Rogers v. Simihson, 54 Conn. 527.
13. Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Conn. 121.
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used in the ordinary course of business, in the way and manner in
which other manufacturers of similar goods are accustomed to use
their own name in the preparation for sale-or sale-of goods."
"Equity will direct how a man should use his name, in his purpose
to denote his individuality. He will not be allowed to so use his
name as to work an injury to another, having the same name,
nor to perpetrate a fraud upon the public." 4 Let us take up the
cases in which the tradesman has been allowed to use his own
name in spite of the fact that a rival had the same name. One
Burgess 15 was allowed in England to sell "Burgess' Essence of
Anchovies," which name was rightfully used by the plaintiff, but
not to say "late of io7 Strand," which was the plaintiff's address,
by whom the defendant had formerly been employed as a clerk.
"Dewar's Whisky" was allowed to be sold as such,16 especially
since the defendant also used the distinctive word "Scotsman"
with his own. So an English chemist, named Swift, secured a state-
ment from the court that he might rightly make Swift's Specific. 1T
J. Milbourn, a former partner in the firm of J. Milbourn & Co.,
was permitted, after dissolution of the firm, to open business next
door to the old shop under his own name. 18 John Turton had
been a steel manufacturer, took his sons into partnership, under
the firm style of John Turton & Sons, and was not restrained,
though sued by Thomas Turton & Sons, who had been in the same
business for many years. 19 Richter was employed by the plaintiff for
eight years to conduct concerts, and then made a contract
with another manager, who advertised Richter Concerts. 2 The
court refused to protect the plaintiff, as there was no proof that the
term had become disassociated from Richter. S. Chivers & Son,
who made Chivers' Jelly,2 1 had no remedy against S. Chivers &
Co., who made Cardiff Jelly at the town of that name. The fact
that the plaintiff was the only manufacturer of that name, prior
14. Baker v. Baker, 78 Off. Gaz. 1421; Afelachrino v. Melachrino, 4 R.
P. C. 2r5; Stuart v. Stuart, 85 Fed. 778, 9x Fed. 243.
r5. Burgess v. Burgess, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 257.
x6. Dewar v. Dewar, 17 R. P. C. 341 (Scotch).
17. Swift Re, 8 R. P. C. 352.
xg. Bond v. Milbourn, 20 W. R. 197.
ig. Turton v. Turton, 42 Ch. D. 128. So- a man named Lazenby was
allowed to use his name in partnership title; Lazenby v. White, 4T L. J. Ch.
354.
20. Franke v. Chalkfell, S7 L. T. N. S. 141.
ix. Chivers vi. Ch'vers, 17 R. P. C. 42o.
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to the defendant's beginning business, did not give him a "mo-
nopoly of his surname." 22 It is not law that, becatise your goods
may be mistaken for another's, you must take extra precautions to
prevent such mistake. You must do something more than merely
use your own name, to cause restraint; and the use of publici juris
characteristics such as tin cans of a certain size, is not enough
more. So there was no remedy given in a case where it was shown
that one trader put Jamieson & Co., and another put George Jam-
ieson on cans of harness composition, there being also two other
Jamiesons making the same goods in Aberdeen,23 where both par-
ties to the suit had their establishments. Valentine & Co. removed
from their old location and two other men of the same name
set up in the same storeroom and the same business as J. Valentine
& Co. The Irish court refused to enjoin them therefor, as the
defendants had been in the same business before, had used a "liter-
ally true and correct description of themselves as a business firm"
and the plaintiff showed no acts complained of besides the use of
the name.
24
In the United States, the defendants in a number of similar
cases have been exonerated from blame. 25 Thus Cutter, a son
of the plaintiff's predecessor, was allowed to distill Cutter's Vhis-
ky, which name the plaintiffs still used. The Prince Brothers,
trading as the Carbon Metallic Paint Company, were not restrained,
at the suit of the makers of Prince's Metallic Paint, from calling
their goods Prince Brothers Iron Ore Paint.26 Hiram Duryea
sold out his starch business to the complainant in 189o and agreed
that he would not use his name in the business for five years.
After the expiration of that time, two of his sons, with other per-
sons, began to sell starch as Duryea & Co., using capital fur-
nished by their father, and no injunction was given against this
incidental injury to the complainant's business. 27 The producer of
22. See Valentine v. Valentine, 3x Ir. L. R. 488. Fact that scale of
prices was the same did not prove fraud.
23. Jamieson v. Jamieson, i5 sP P. C. 169. Claimant used horse on label,
defendant did not. Cash v. Cash, xg R. P. C. x8r reversing 18 R. P. C. 213.
J. & J. Cash, Ld., could not restrain Joseph Cash & Co., Ld., from using their
name.
24. Valentine v. Valentine, 31 Ir. L. R. 488. See 17 R. P. C. I and 673.
25. Rogers v. Rogers, 70 Fed. ioig. See Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Conn.
121; Rogers V. Rogers, 84 Fed. 639; Hardy v. Cutter, 3 Off. Gaz. 468.
26. Prince v. Carbon Etc. Co., Dig. 573.
27. National Starch Co. v. Duryea, 79 Fed. 65I (C. C. A.) 91 Off. Gaz.
2373. Defendant company need not name the other partners.
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Landreth's Extra Early Peas could not prevent another Landreth
from using his name, with the same descriptive words, provided
he clearly informed the public that the peas were of his own
growth. 28 The fact that the defendant is a bona fide manufacturer
of goods and not an indifferent person, who happens to have the
same name as the plaintiff, is one of importance. Eli Pettijohn
made rolled wheat and then came to Minnesota, where his son had
formerly had a similar business, bought the son's machinery
and resumed business together with others as the Eli Pettijohn's
Cereal Co. and was sustained in his right to his name. He had
placed his picture on the wrapper of his goods, so the "personality
of this man, as distinguished from any other Pettijohn, is made as
pronounced as possible." 20 He called his goods Eli Pettijohn's
Best and this is a comparison of the product with other like pro-
ducts made, formerly or contemporaneously, by Eli Pettijohn him-
self and not by any other manufacturer of that name. 8 o Johann H.
Faber can not be prevented by A. W. Faber from placing his full
name on pencils. 31 Decker & Barnes can make Decker Pianos, in
spite of the protests of Decker Brothers. 32 E. G. Blakeslee and his
sons may carry on Blakeslee & Sons Iron Works, though they are
rivals to the Blakeslee Manufacturing Co. " John W. Scott sold his
business to the Scott Stamp and Coin Co., Ld., and agreed not to en-
gage in the postage stamp business for two years. " At the end of
that time he resumed business, rightfully, as J. W. Scott Co., Ld.
Where a man named Clark engages in the manufacture of spool
cotton, he may not restrain the defendants, one of whom is named
Clark, from placing that name on similar goods, " and so J. & P.
28. Landreth v. Landreth, 29 Off. Gaz. 1131.
29. American Cereal Co. v. .Pettijokn, 72 Off. Gaz. 903, 76 Fed. 372. See
Davey v. Davy, so N. Y. Supp. 161.
30. See von Faber v. Faber, 124 Fed. 603.
31. Faber v. Faber, 3 Abb. N. S. IS, 49 Barb. 357.
32. Decker v. Decker, 54 How. Pr. 218.
33. Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 58 N. Y. Super. Ct. 383.
34. Scott v. Scott, 58 N. Y. Super. Cr. 380.
35. .Tarson v. Holland, 46 Atl. 271. Neither could call goods genuine.
Contra where defendant was fraudulent. Clark v. Armitage, 67 Fed. 896,
76 Off. Gaz. 1419.
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Coats, 36 who were also engaged in the manufacture of spool cotton,
could not enjoin J. & T. Coats' successors from using their name.
Meneely made bells S and was succeeded by Andrew Meneely's
Sons, the plaintiffs, to whom he left the exclusive use of his name,
but no injunction was given against another son, who cast bells in
the same town, Troy, under the partnership name of Meneely &
Kimberly. A man and his son were both named Henry Carter. 's
The father changed his name to Frank Leslie, and the son was then
known as Frank Leslie, Jr. Afterwards, by the father's threats and
a supposed order of court forbidding him to use that name, the son
changed his signature to Henry Leslie, but his wife and other rela-
tives still knew him as Frank. On finding there was no order of
court, he resumed the old style and published Frank Leslie, Jr.'s
Sporting & Dramatic Times, a different sort of paper from any
published by his father, and was not enjoined for the use of the
name. The widow and children of William Bingham were not re-
strained from carrying on a school under his name at Mebane,
North Carolina, at the suit of one who carried on the Bingham
School at Asheville. The fact that there had been a break in the
operation of a school long carried on at a place by persons of one
family does not forbid the right of the proper representatives of
that family from reviving the school at that place and under the
former name, though another member of the family during the
cessation opened a school under the family name in another part of
the state. "I Hiram and Noah Piper carried on business in Canada
as H. Piper & Brother. 40 Later Hiram was in business alone and
36. Coats v. Platt, 17 Leg. Int. 213. Of defendants: John was a minor
son and a surgeon and so placing his name first was unusual, but the. practice
had not been restrained in Scotland, where the parties lived, and the New
York courts did nothing to check defendants, though their conduct "trod, on
the verge of the law." So in Comstock v. Moore, i8 How. Pr. 421, defendant
was allowed to style his firm A. J. White & Co., when White was a member
of it, though that firm name existed when the plaintiffs were partners in the
firm. Again in Fite v. Dorman, 57 S. W. 129, the defendant, who had sold
plaintiff his business without use of his trade name, was allowed to form a
corporation with his name as.a prominent element in the corporate name. In
Marshall v. Pinkh am, 52 Wis. 572, Marshall's father made goods from a
recipe which he gave to various members of the family, permitting them to
sell the articles for their benefit and the son tvas not allowed to enjoin the
other children or their assigns from calling the goods Marshall's.
37. Meneely v. Meneely, i Hun 367, 62 N. Y. 427.
38. England z. N. Y. Pub. Co., 8 Daly 375.
39. Bingham v. Gray, 122 N. C. 243.
40. Atkins v. Pifer, i5 Gr. U. C. Ch. 58I.
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then assigned business and name to. a tradesman, who was given
no remedy against Noah's sons, one of whom was named Henry
and who opened business next door to the assignee as H. Piper &
Co.
A bankrupt may usually make use of his name, if he resumes
business, especially when the purchaser under the assignment does
not use that name. 41 Prince had a mine whence he made metallic
paint. He formed a corporation which failed. Then the successors,
who called themselves Prince's Metallic Paint Co., unsuccessfully
sued Prince's sons who bought from a judgment creditor old trade-
mark rights, half the old mill and the ore and called themselves
Prince Manufacturing Co. 42 Tarrant, Williams & Co. 43 sold their
*business and goodwill, but not the use of their trade name, to a firm
which failed to restrain three men from subsequently doing busi-
ness in their own names as Tarrant, Williams & Clark. There might
be confusion, but there was no fraud. Horton was formerly in the
firm of T. Horton & Co., and, after he retired, the business was re-
moved from Indiana to New York and the name was made Horton
Manufacturing Co., with his consent. Afterwards the business was
incorporated. He later began business again in Indiana as T. Hor-
ton & Co. and was succeeded by the Horton Manufacturing Co., to
which he expressly granted the right to use his name. The Federal
court held that the new organization had a right to the name, as
the consent without consideration to the old one was probably a
mere license revocable at pleasure, and, in any case, could not be
properly transferred to another company or to a corporation with-
out Horton's consent.
A man might willingly forego the use of his name in favor
of an ordinary partnership, but from such grant could not
reasonably be inferred an intention to authorize a transfer
whereby a man might be perpetually deprived of the control of
his own name. 44 In the United States, probably the most interest-
ing cases are the Baker ones. 45 Walter Baker of Dorchester,
Mass., whose business was established in I78O, made preparations
of chocolate. In 1894, one William H. Baker, of Winchester, Va.,
whose family had become established in mercantile business in 1785,
41. Iowa Seed Co. v'. Dorr, 70 Iowa 48r.
42. Prince vn. Prince, 57 Fed. 938.
43. Williams vn. Tarrans, 78 Off. Gaz. 1233.
44. Horton Co. v.. Horton Co., iS Fed. 816.
45. Baker v. Baker, 78 Off. Gaz. 1427; Baker v. Sanders, so Off. Gaz.
1217. S ee Pillsbury vn. Pillsbury, 64 Fed. 841; Devln v. Devlin, 4 Hun 651
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began making chocolate goods and selling them as W. H. Baker &
Co. He had no partner and dressed up his goods somewhat like
plaintiff's. The plaintiff's goods were known as Baker's chocolate
and confusion resulted, so that the defendant was enjoined from
saying "& Company," from using the words "Established in Mer-
cantile Business 1785," from using Baker or Baker's, without his
initials, and was required to distinguish his goods clearly from those
of Walter Baker & Co. In 1896, Wm. P. Baker 46 of New York
began advertising Baker's or Win. P. Baker's cocoa and was en-
joined, being allowed only to say Cocoa made by Wm. P. Baker of
New York. In 1899, Wm. H. Baker 47 of Syracuse was sued by
Wm. H. Baker of Winchester, for issuing simulating circulars. He
was enjoined and ordered to use his first name William in full and
to give the town name, Syracuse, with his name. He incorpora-
ted the William H. Baker Co., called his goods the Justice Brand
and the court refused further remedy. A firm containing a man
named Allegretti 48 and trading in New York City as Allegretti &
Co. was enjoined at the suit of a Chicago firm, the Allegretti Co.,
from using the name, without adding "No connection with the orig-
inal Allegretti of Chicago." De Long's Hooks and Eyes 4, must not
be made by a corporation, of which Oscar A. De Long is president,
nor could the corporation be called the De Long Hook & Eye Co.
as the name would indicate another maker, but Oscar A. De Long
might use his own full name honestly with such goods. 50
A man may not use a deceptive title with his name. Dr. J. D.
Thomas, a dentist, had an office at 912 Walnut St. and restrained
by suit a brother, D. S. Thomas, who opened an office at 905 Wal-
nut St., from using the title Doctor, simulating signs and adver-
tisements, and misrepresenting former connection with him. 51 The
successor of the original Faber, who manufactured pencils, proved
that the name had become a trade name of the article and the court
held that no special right to use the name accrued by reason of re-
46. Baker v. Baker, 87 Fed. 2o9.
47. Baker v. Baker, xri Fed. 297; Baker v'. Sanders, 97 Fed. 948.
48. Allegrettiv. Keller, 85 Fed. 643. See Allegretti v. Allegretti,
177 IUl. x29; Allegretti v. Rubel, 76 111-.App. 58r, 86 I1. App. 6oo, 6o4.
49. DeLong v. De Long, 39 N. Y. Supp. 903, 74Off. Gaz. 809, 811.
5o. So Stuart's Dyspepsia Tablets were enjoined. Stuart v. Stuart, 85
Fed. 778, 9x Fed. 243. See Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 17r.
Sz. Thomas v'. Thomas, 8 W. N. C. 375. The brother then studied den-
tistry and was relieved from the injunction as far as it prevented him from
styling himself Doctor. See Comstock v. Moore, x8 How. Fr. 421.
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lationshlip which others bore to him and that the defendant could
not use the name, nor his initial, but must say Johann E. Faber,
J. Eberhard Faber, or Eberhard Faber. 52  So Leopold Hoff, a
nephew of Johann Hoff, the first maker of Malt Extract, must use
his whole name prominently on his bottles. 5 3 Rudolph Standinger
kept a restaurant at 116 Broadway, New York City, under his
Christain name, Rudolph's, and his widow successfully prevented
his brother, who had been a partner in the business, from opening
a restaurant in the building adjacent, under the name of Rudolph's
Brothers. 54 Frazer invented axle grease, which he called by his
name, and, having sold the business, was not allowed later to de-
feat the right of his grantees and sell Superior Axle Grease-S.
Frazer & Co. The plaintiff was formerly named Trust and
changed his name to Gourand. 56 His sons, whose names were not
changed, were restrained from making a preparation with a name
slightly changed from that made by their father and connecting
that name with the words "Dr. T. F. Gourand's Sons." One Jung
changed the spelling of his name to Young 7 and openeda business a
block away from De Youngs, with simulating signs, calling himself
The Youngs and was enjoined, not for changing the spelling of his
name, but for perpetrating a fraud. Welcome A. Smith, a grocer,
long sold Welcome Soap and then had a manufacturer make for him
a soap of different appearance. On the label he placed his name,
with the Christian name in much larger letters than the rest, and
arranged so that it alone appeared at the end of the package. On
complaint, he changed the label so that his whole name was in one
line of the same sized type. The court said Smith was hardly suffi-
clent to identify him and he might use his full name, but must not
segregate his Christian name, place it in larger type, or so locate
it as to admit the inference that he sold Welcome Soap. 58 A man
named Royal sold Baking Powder, with a label similar to that of
the Royal Baking Powder Co. and called it New Royal. He then
changed the color of his label, and called the goods Maxim Baking
Powder, but printed his name prominently on the cans (so that th6
52. Von Faber v. Faber, X24 Fed. 603. See Clark v. Armitage, 67 Fed.
896, 76 Off. Gaz. 1419.
53. Tarrantv . Hoff, 78 Off. Gaz. 1607, 7r Fed. 163.
54. Standinger v. Standinger, i9 Leg. Int. 85.
55. Frazer v. Frazer, 9 West R. 763. See Nolan v. Nolan, 131 Cal. 271.
56. Gourand v. Trust, 3 Hun, 627.
57. De Youngs V. Jung, 25 N. Y. Supp. 479, 27 N. Y. Supp. 370.
58. Lever v. Smith, 112 Fed. 998.
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name Royal sold his goods still) and was enjoined from such dis-
play on the front of his cans. " A certain prescription was so re-
commended by Capt. Storm to his friends 00 that the druggists who
put it up called it Storm's Liver Regulator, in compliment to him,
and then prevented Capt. Storm's son, who was not a druggist,
from putting up a medicine after another formula, selling it as
Storm's Liver Regulator and advertising that "this medicine is
based on the original prescription prepared for Captain Adam
Storm." The plaintiff in New York, carried on business for many
years as "Arnheim the tailor," but had latterly dropped the phrase, 61
yet he prevented the defendant from using it with imitation of his
(the plaintiff's) signs, boxes &c., as the name was unfamiliar in
the city save as associated with him. Abraham Biningner 62 had an in-
junction against a former partner, Abraham B. Clark, who, with his
son, opened a store next door to plaintiff's former store as A. Bining-
ner Clark and Son, and advertised that they succeeded the old firm,
and placed on the old store a sign, stating that they had removed to
next door. Two men named De Grauw and Aymar63 were not allowed
with others to form a corporation, by the name of De Grauw, Ay-
mar & Co., when there was an established business, carried on under
that name by the survivor of the firm, who had bought the firm
name. Two brothers, named Chickering, who were grandnephews
of the original maker of the Chickering pianos, opened a piano
manufactory as Chickering Bros. 64 and put Chickering on the fall
board. They conveyed the idea, by their circulars, that their pianos
were those long known, and said they were the sole living male
representatives of the family, who originated the Chickering pianos,
and made the only piano made by a Chickering. " At the suit of the
successors of the original company, they were restrained from calling
their pianos Chickering, or using that word, alone or with another
word, as the name of a corporation, making pianos, or using the
word on pianos, or circulars, unless they said "not original Chicker-
59. Royal B. P. Co. v. Royal, 122 Fed. 337. If his name was different,
the display would prove his honesty. He offered to sell out to plaintiff which
is evidence of fraudulent intent and he formerly made bicycles.
6o. Robinson v. Storm, 52 S. W. 880.
6r. Arnheim v. Arnheim, 59 N. Y. Supp. 948.
62. Bininger v. Clark, 6o Barb. i r3.
63. De Grauw v'. Schmidt, S6 N. Y. Supp. 593, 59 N. Y. Supp. 569.
64. Chickering v. Chickering, 12o Fed. 69. See Wyckoff v. Hotve, iio
Fed. 520, 122 Fed. 348; Rogers v. Rogers. ii Fed. 495; Rogers v. Rogers, 70
Fed. 1017, 73 Off. Gaz. 971.
65. Hopkinson piano could not be used, without distinctive word, by any-
one but the original maker thereof. Hopkinson Re. 9 R. P. C. 102. See
Montreal Co. v. Sabastion, (1899) A. C. 6xo.
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ings," or "not connected with Chickering & Sons." They were
also restrained from distributing a booklet, called "A Sketch of the
Chickering family and their famous pianos." The fact that the de-
fendant organized the plaintiff company and was the first to make
the articles does not permit him so to use his name as to confound
his articles with theirs. 66
When a man has assigned his business to another, it was held
in Maryland 6 7 that the assignment to use the name of the assignor
was personal and could not be transferred to a third party, in the
absence of express stipulation. Bagby and Rivers had been partners
under that style and, when they dissolved the firm, it was agreed that
Bagby might use the old name. Afterwards he formed the Bagby
& Rivers Co. and sued Rivers, who had begun business under his
own name. The court, however, not only upheld Rivers' right so to
do, but enjoined the company from using Rivers' name. A dis-
tinction was made in New York between using the name of a cor-
poration containing a man's name and using his name, and the Cut-
ter Silk Manufacturing Co. was not restrained at the suit of Cut-
ter, from using its name, but was restrained from placing the
word Cutter on the ends of spools of cotton thread.68
One has exclusive right to the use of his name, 69 save as to those
having the same name and may prevent his assignee from the unau-
thorized use of it on wagons, bill-heads, &c., in connection with the
business. However, the courts of New York refused to enforce the
right to the use of a man's name when he had made a general assign-
ment and abandoned the use of it in trade for twenty-five years and
the defendants had purchased the right to use the name from his
assignees twenty years after the assignment. 70
A man in many cases, especially when his name is peculiar, has
lost the right to form a company bearing his name, if the name has
been previously connected with a company with which the new
organization competes. Thus the Van Aukens who had formed the
66. Penberthy Co. v. Lee, 78 N. W. 1074.
67. Bagby v. Rivers, 87 Md. 400.
68. Cutter v. Gudebrod, 61 N. Y. Supp. 225.
69. Schererv. Am. Ice Co., 66 N. Y. Supp. 3. Otherwise he would be
liable to cost and vexation of suits brought against him and would suffer
detriment should he later engage in the business.
70. Bellows v. Bellows, 53 N. Y. Supp. 853.
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Van Auken Co., sold out and, with others, formed the Van Auken
Specialty Co. They were enjoined from the use of the name ;71 and
Lamb, 72 who invented a knitting machine and sold the rights of
manufacturing it to the Lamb Manufacturing Co., whose rights
were assigned to Lamb Knit Goods Co., had no right later to or-
ganize the Lamb Glove & Mitten Co. and engage in the same busi-
ness in another small town in the same state. The business of both
corporations was conducted chiefly through agents and the public
had been deceived. The name of the former maker may have
become a mere adjective of description and the successor to the
business who purchased the right to use it may successfully defend
it against the bearer of the name. Thus Oakes was not allowed
even to place Peter Oakes on candy, for the reputation of the candy
came not from his skill in making it, but from the ingredients. 79
There are many cases in which a man has been restrained from an
improper use of his name, when he has not taken steps which every
honest man should take to prevent confusion of goods. '4 In Eng-
land, a carpenter, named Warner, who bought the manufacture of
Ashford's Gout and Rheumatic cure, and used his name with
the goods, was restrained at the suit of the makers of Warner's
Safe Cure.75  So H. B. Kimpton and his wife H. L. Kimp-
ton were restrained from carrying on business in medi-
cal books, under the name of H. Kimpton, and representing them-
selves as the successors of the man of that name who was H. B.
Kimpton's father, and had carried on such business for many years
a few doors from defendant's shop. The suit was brought by the
trustee of H. Kimpton's widow. 7 6 J. Brinsmead & Sons' made
pianos" and T. E. Brinsmead and his two sons worked for them
as mere mechanics. They later formed a corporation, under the
name of T. E. Brinsmead & Sons and manufactured pianos but were
7x. Van Auken Co. v. Van Auken Sfieeialty Co., S7 Ill. App. 240.
72. Lamb v. Lamb, 120 Mich. i59.
73. Oakes v. Tonsmierre, 49 Fed. 447. Skinner v. Oakes, io Mo. App.
45; Probasco v. Bonyon, i Mo. App. 241.
74. See Norman v. Norman, cited in 9 Ch. D. 56o. A man named Cash
might not advertise Cash's woven names, Cash's initials, nor Cash's frillings,for
this use would mislead. Cash v. Cash, i9 R. P. C. 18x, reversing x8 R. P. C.
213.
75. Warner Re., 5 T. L. R. 327.
76. Nicholls v. Kimftion, 5 T. L. R. 674; James v.James, L. R. 13 Eq.
42r. Robert Joseph James was compelled to use his full middle name in con-
nection with the sale of horse blisters. There was dressing up here.
77. Brinsmead Re., (1897) 1 Ch. 45, 406.
A MAN AND HIS NAME.
enjoined from using the word Brinsmead in such business, without
adding the express statement that they were distinct from the old
firm. E. J. Jarman was allowed to trade under his own name, but not
as Jarman & Co., or Jarman & Jarman, the plaintiff's business
name.7 8 Valentine's Extract -of Meat was made by one process by
the plaintiff and by another by the defendant. The latter was re-
strained from so doing, 7 9 or from forming the Valentine Extract
Co., which would be thought a company to deal in Valentine's ex-
tract rather than one merely formed by a Valentine. A firm was in
business as Brand & Co. 80 A brother of one of the plaintiffs, who
had been his clerk, went into the same business with Mason as Brand
& Mason; suit followed but was compromised by the defendants'
changing their name to Mason & Brand. Later Brand retired from
the firm and Mason was enjoined from using the firm style, though
be might transact business under his own name and state that he
bad been employed by Brand & Co. and had learned their methods.
In New South Wales, 8 two brothers named Taylor were enjoined
from trading as Taylor & Co., at the suit of' the successors of Tay-
lor Brothers, by whom the defendants had been previously em-
-ployed, or from using the name, Taylor, without an express state-
ment that they were not connected with the plaintiff. Dunlop has
been held in England to have become so associated with bicycle
goods that a defendant was enjoined from such use, although he
claimed to have formerly been in business with another Dunlop
and to have bought out the right to use his name. The use would
lead customers to believe that the goods were plaintiff's, or at least
that they had their sanction, or were connected in some way with
them. 82 Other cases involving license to use another name are:
those in-which a man who claimed to have bought from one Brindle
88
the right to mark watches with his name failed to
enjoin another who sold watches bought from Brindle him-
self and marked with the name; and in which a man, who
had in his employ a person named Southorn, was enjoined from
advertising Reynold's Purified Clay Pipes made by Southorn
from Broseley, at the suit of the maker of Southorn's Broseley
78. Townsend v. Jarmen, x7 R. P. C. 649.
79. Valentine v. Valentine, 17 R. P. C. 673 reversing x7 R. P. C. i.
8o. Dence v. Mason, (1877) W. N. 23; (x878)W. N. 42.
81. Pralten v. Peacock, 2o N. S. W. L. R. Eq. x47.
82. Dunlofi Co. v. Dunlofi Co. x6 R. P. C. 12.
83. Samuel v. Berger, 4 Abb. Pr. 88.
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Pipes. 84 Hallet sold Cumston the right to use his name
on goods. After the latter's death, his son continued the busi-
ness and the use of the name. Hallett protested and Cumston alleged
he had bought the right to use the name from another Hallett, while
the court held that Hallett could not maintain a suit, as he did not
allege that Cumston used the name with intent to represent it as the
plaintiff's and injure him. 85 Holbrook, employed by plaintiff, agreed
that their Worcestershire Sauce should bear his name. Later he left
them and sold the same right to another maker of the sauce. Both
were enjoined, as Holbrook was not using his own name, but had
sold it in gross to traders who wished to use it to pass off
goods. He could not use it himself in connection with these goods,
except by making a distinguishing addition to his own name. sB
Abel Morrall, needle makers for a century, bought Joseph Mogg &
Co's. business in i89I and used both names. m-Another trader,
who began business in 1893, bought four years later the business
of Win. Mogg, who made crochet hooks and packet needles. It ap-
pears that there are three grades in the manufacture of needles :(I)
needle stampers who make the eye in the wire, (2) manufacturers in
the plain, and (3) finishers who placetheneedlesinsmall parcels and
alone meet the public. After hiq sale, Wm. Mogg, continued his
business without molestation from the purchaser thereof, which is
evidence that the latter wished another name and not another busi-
ness. In i9oO, he bought from Jabez Yardly Morrall the name and
the good will and stock in trade of a business for 63 6, of which only
£4 belonged to the needle busines, and used both names. Restraint
against this use was decreed, as the purchases were only colorable
devices to give one an appearance of right to use these names. The
different initials were insufficient to distinguish the goods and, by
using the surnames, the defendant might obtain trade intended for
the plaintiff. Elias Howe patented sewing machines and gave li-
censes to a number of firms to use the patent.8 8 One of these was
Amasa B. Howe and when he sued another firm for using the word
Howe, in which firm Elias Howe himself was the largest stock-
holder, the court held that though the plaintiff was a licensee and
could not have manufactured his machines without using the pat-
ent, yet he could adopt and appropriate the name Howe to distin-
84. Southorn v. Reynolds, 12 L. T. N. S. 75.
85. Hallett v. Cumston, iso Mass. 29.
86. Birmingham Co. v. Lierfiool Co., 32 Sol. J. 559.
87. Morrall z. Hessin, ig R. P. C. 557.
88. Howe v. Howe. So Barb. 236.
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guish his machines from those of other licensees and could defend
that use of the name, even against Elias Howe, who had no righl
to use it so as to deceive the public and deprive his licensee of the
market his (the licencee's) machines had gained.
In the use of one's name one must not make a collateral mis-
representation which is descriptive. 89 The use of the term "& Com-
pany" 0 by one who had no partner is frowned on by the law, as
is the word "Brothers" when defendant is alone in business. 91 It
is unlawful to use a name like another's colorably 92 by obtaining li-
cense from another of that name. This is true, whether the license
be from one whose name is like that of a person or a product. For
example, the fact that the manufacturers of El Falco cigars took
an assignment of the right to use that name from Mr. Falco did not
prevent them from being enjoined from the use of the name, 93 at
the suit of the manufacturers of El Falco cigars. So a man was
enjoined who bought from one of his salesmen, L. B. Taylor, the
right to use his name and under the name of L. B. Taylor & Co.
sold hairpins, dressed up like the plaintiff's, which were also called
Taylor's. 9, The successors or Talmey & Co., who kept the old sign
over their door, though they had a different registered name, re-
strained Thompson and another for carrying on business as Thomp-
son, Talmey & Co., though they alleged that Talmey was willing
that they should use his name. 91 The successors of S. Howes' Co.,
which manufactured grain cleaners, had injunction against Howes'
Grain Cleaner Co. which bought from Chas. H. Howes, an execu-
tor of S. Howes, the right to use his surname, A4ich had never been
used by a third party in that business. 98 The sale of needles under
the name of D. Shrimpton Turvey and with his license was re-
strained at the suit of Shrimpton & Hooper, " and a tradesman was
89. De Young V. Jrung, 2 5 N. Y. Supp. 479, 27 N. Y. Supp. 370.
go. Lothrofi v. Lothrofi, 47 How. Pr. 532; Gravely v. Winchester, Dig.
272 (defendant here fraudulently represented that he succeeded to plaintiff's
business). Fullwoodz. Fullwood, Dig. 421; Camfibello. Hollins, Dig. 548,
at suit of Minton Hollins & Co. Robert Minton Taylor, formerly a partner in
the firm, was restrained from adding "& Co." to his name,as he traded alone.
91. Woolv. Woolf, 43 Sol. J. 127.
92. Wolfe v'. Barnett, 24 La. Ann. 97; Rogers v. Rogers, ii Fed. 495.
93. Falk v. Am. Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. 547.
94. Williams v. Brooks, 5o Conn. 278.
95. Pearks v. Thomfison, iS R. P. C. i85.
96. Howes v. Howes, 52 N. Y. Supp. 468.
97. Shrimpton v. Laight, x8 Beav. 164.
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enjoined from making Dr. Bull's Cough Syrup 9 8 at the suit of the
original makers of the medicine of that name, though defendant
had bought from a Dr. Bull the right so to use his name.
When a man's name is used in business merely because his
name is like that under which the plaintiff's article has gained repu-
tation, restraint follows, though the man whose name is used may
be, at least ostensibly, a partner in the defendant organization. Thus
E. H. Gato, who puts his name on cigar boxes, 99 succeeds in pre-
venting the defendant from putting the name of his junior partner,
G. H. Gato, on similar boxes. So George A. Hires 100 was formerly
in business with the Chas. E. Hires Co., but when the defendant
company was formed, as George A. Hires & Co., his name being
used merely because of the fortuitous identity with plaintiff's, the
law restrained the dressing up of defendant's packages like plain-
tiff's and the use of that name, which potently increased the con-
joined force and effect of the other deceptive devices used by the
defendant. So injunction was issued against the use of the name
Frank Chicory Co., in which Frank was a minority stockholder,
and not the manager, 01 and against A. S. Stonebreaker 102 who,
with a number of associates, started to sell Stonebreaker's medi-
cines, a term associated by the public with the goods of his brother,
Henry Stonebreaker, whose celebrity he tried to appropriate.
Again, a tradesman was enjoined, at the suit of Heinisch's Sons,
from putting on shears the name of H. G. Heinisch, from whom he
had bought that right, and who agreed to impart any information
he might have as to cutlery manufacture. He merely looked at
samples of defendant's goods and said he was satisfied with them
and considered them equal to the original R. Ieinisch's articles: 103
No good will was bought with a going business, nor did Heinisch
associate himself with the manufacturers by investing money, tak-
ing supervision, or actually exercising his skill in manufacturing
the goods. Garrett's Snuff 'had obtained a wide reputation, which
induced a company to call itself by the name of one Garrett, who
98. Meyer v. Bull, 66 Off. Gaz. 1755.
99. El Zfodelo Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886.
ioo. Hires v. Hires, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 285. See Beal v. Chase, 3r Mich.
490.
iox. Frank v. Frank, 95 Fed. 8x8.
102. Stonebraker v. Stonebraker, 33 Md. 252. Defendant had made no
medicine for seven years until just before the trial.
xo3. Heinisch v. Boker, 86 Fed 765. Labels also copied.
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was a subordinate employee. 104 The court restrained this use of
the name, as a wrongful attempt to appropriate the older business'
good will.
The English cases speak to the same point. Thorley made Cat-
tle Food. 105 After his death, his brother gives the receipt to a com-
pany, is employed by it and takes one of the 4ooo shares of stock,
but the company is called Thorley Cattle Food Co., and is prompt-
ly enjoined, when sued by the original company. Again the pro-
prietor of Day & Martin's blacking obtained a preliminary injunct-
ion against one Day, an ironmonger's assistant, and Martin, a to-
bacconist, who formed a partnership to carry on the. blacking busi-
ness under the name of Day & Martin. 106 In another case, 10 7 the
same plaintiff, though no one named either Day or Martin was left
in the firm, enjoined two men named Day and Martin from simula-
ting labels and using their names in a manner calculated to mislead
the public and obtain at the expense of the plaintiff, a benefit to
which they are not entitled in fair and honest dealing. In a simi-
lar case, the defendant, Atkins, had been in plaintiff's employ and
set up in business in partnership with a man named Schweitzer and
sold Otto Schweitzer & Atkins' Cacaotine. He was enjoined when
sued by the proprietors of Schweitzer's Cacaotine. 108 So a com-
pany which had taken in a man named Dunlop, not before in the
bicycle trade, was enjoined at the suit of the Dunlop Bicycle Co.
from using the word Dunlop, in the manufacture of a contrivance
to lessen the jar from riding over rough roads; and also in the
manufacture of bicycles. 109 The defendant's circulars said they had
no connection with the plaintiffs, but, in spite of this, the use of the
name would deceive the public. In still another case, 110 the plain-
tiff sold cigarettes and refused to take in his brother as a partner.
After having had a short experience as a clerk, the brother contract-
ed with one Poulides to become manager of the Melachrino Egypt-
ian Cigarette Co., took a store nearby, and put merely the word
Melachrino on one sign. He was restrained by the court which
held that he had sold his name to another for the purpose of carry-
ing on a rival trade fraudulently.
104. Garrett v. Garrett, 79 Off. Gaz. x6Sx.
ro5. Mfassam v. Thorley, 14 Ch. D. 748.
io6. Clayton V. Day, 26 Sol. J. 43. They used simulating wrappers.
107. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84.
ioB. Schweitzer v. Atkins, 37 L. J. Ch. 847.
1o9. Dunlop V. Dunlop, 40 Sol. J. 544-
nxo. Mfelachrino v. Aelachrino, 4 R. P. C. 215.
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As we have seen, a man may have the right to use his own name
but not to transfer that right to a corporation. In other cases
of the sort, Mme. Tussaud & Sons, Ld., secured an injunction against
the registration of a new company as Louis Tussaud Co., Ld., of
which company Louis Tussaud was to be the manager; 11' and Otard
Dupuy & Co. restrained the Otard de Montebello Coguar Co. from
using its name, though the Marquise de Montebello ne6 Otard
formed the company and was the chief stockholder. 1 2
In the Federal courts, it was held that two descendants of the
inventor of the Remington typewriter had no right to become stock-
holders of a corporation which manufactured typewriters and have
the name of the corporation changed to the Remington Sholes Co.,
which might make the public believe that the defendant's product
was a new style of the old machine. Even if they did not deceive
the immediate purchasers, they put a constant temptation to middle-
men to deceive ultimate purchasers. 113 If the name is used as
part of a corporate name, it may not, in some cases, be used by anoth-
er corporation, while the first one continues in business. rn
New York, Charles S. Higgins, who formed the Charles S.
Higgins Company to make Higgins' Soap, 1 4 withdrew and formed
the Higgins Soap Co. The latter company was forbidden to use
the name, which was descriptive. It derived no additional immuni-
ty from the fact that one named Higgins was an incorporator. In
a similar case in Connecticut, 15 the Holmes, Booth, Haydens
Company was protected against the use by a rival company, in the
same town, of the name Homes, Booth & Atwood Manufacturing
Company.
It goes without saying that a man may, by contract, disable him-
self from the use of his name in a certain line of business. "6 Then
he can not print his name on a periodical, if he be a publisher. Hav-
ing permitted plaintiff to use his name with Christmas annuals, the
defendant could not advertise that he would issue his usual Christ-
in. Tussaudv. Tussaud, 44 Ch. D. 678.
112. Otard v. OtardCo.,.9 T. L. R. 295, zo T. L. R. 67. There was no
question as to her use of her name.
113. Wyckoflv. Howe, no Fed. 520, 122 Fed. 348. Cf. the Manchester
Brewing Case. See Int. Silver Co. v. Rogers, nio Fed. 955; Rogers v. Int.
Silver Co., 113 Fed. 526, ii8 Fed. 133; Rogers v. Rogers, 7o Fed. 107, 73
Off. Gaz. 970.
114. Higgins v. Higgins, z44 N. Y. 462.
i5. Holmes etc. v. Holmes etc., 37 Conn. 278.
II6. Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 W. R. 630.
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mas annual, 1 1 7 nor lend the use of his name to a firm or a joint
stock company,"" nor, it may be, to use his name with the title
"manager," 119 nor to say he is the "same O'Connor who had to do
with this valuable business," 1 20 when he had covenanted not to say
he was formerly connected with plaintiff. In an oft cited case, one
John Douglas, 121 who sold out his rights in the business of John
Douglas and then reopened a similar business, under the same name
in the same place, employing the same clerks, was enjoined
from using that name, as it would represent to the world that the
identical business, whose good will he sold, was still carried on by
him. 122 In Canada, the same prohibition is enforced, preventing
a man to "derogate from his own grant." 1 23  A firm, of which
Beatty was a member, manufactured copy books and called them
Beatty's Head-line Copy Books. Afterwards, Beatty left the firm
and prepared copy books for another trader, which books were
called Beatty's New & Improved Head-line Copy Books, against
which use injunction issued, as a purchaser, "unless thoroughly
acquainted with both the works," would be satisfied that he re-
ceived plaintiff's book, on being handed one of the defendant's.
The courts in the United States have not hesitated to enforce
restrictive covenants by which a man has given up the right to use
his own name. 124 On the other hand the brothers Fish'125 made
wagons at Racine, Wisconsin, and sold their business to Fish Broth-
ers Wagon Co. Later they organized, for the same business, the
117. Ward v. Beeton, 23 W. R. 533. See Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 W.
R. 630.
x8. Rendle v. Rendle, 63 L. T. N. S. 94.
1i9. Dales vu. Weaber, 18 W. R. 993.
120. Wolmershausen v. O'Connor, 36 L. T. N. S. 921; Vernon v. -al-
Jam, 34 Ch. D. 748.
i21. Churton v. Douglas, 7 W. R. 365, 5 Jur. N. S. 887.
122. Distinguish this case from one where learned works are concerned.
Canada Pub. Co. v. Gage, ii Ont. A. R. 402; on app., ii Can. S. C. R. 3o6.
123 See Mosso.6 v. Mason, 17 Gr. U. C. Ch. 36o, 18 Gr. U. C. Ch. 453.
124. Richmond v. Richmond, 52 Off. Gaz. 3o6. The right to use one's
portrait follows the right to use one's name. Richmond Nervine Co. v. Rich-
mond, 159 U. S. 293; Lashur v,. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 385; Williams v. Far-
rand, 88 Mich 473; Simmons z'. Simmons, 81 Fed. x63; Chattanooga M di-
tine Co. v. Thedford, 49 Fed. 949, 58 Fed. 347; 73 Off. Gaz. 2z63; Sfiieker v.
Lash, 102 Cal. 38.
125. Fish Bros. v. Fish Bros., 87 Fed. 203, 95 Fed. 457; Fish . La Belle
Works, 82 Wis. 546, 52 N. W. 595.
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Fish Brothers Manufacturing Co., with its factory in Iowa. It was
held by the courts that the Fish Brothers, as originators of the
wagon, could still manufacture it, call it the Fish Wagon, and use
a business name, which indicated both that the trader was a succes-
sor to the parties who built up the Racine Works and the persons
who previously made the wagons and from whom they derived
their name. The rights of the Fish Brothers had also so passed to
the assignees that the latter might call their article the Fish Wagon.
In another case, Le Page, who had made liquid glue, 1 26 sold the
Russia Cement Co., his business and trademarks and, afterwards,
began to make the same article and call it by the same name. He
was restrained by the courts, as Le Page's Glue was a trade name
serving to distinguish the plaintiff's goods. The fact that Le Page
called his new product Improved Liquid Glue was no sufficient
defense, nor could he say "glue made by Le Page," nor did the later
acquisition of a patent authorize him to stamp his name on the
goods. A corporation, the Le Page Co., whose stockholders are
Le Page, his wife, and his counsel, and in which Le Page is the
active officer, stands in no better case, being a mere cover for him,
and is also restrained. Le Page had so sold the right to use his own
name in connection with glue as to deprive himself of the right to,
use it, and could not reclaim the right by misleading artifice. In
Maine, the defendant John Winslow Jones, 12 7 formerly made Win-
slow's Green Corn after a process originated by Isaac Winslow, and
sold the business to the plaintiff. Later he resumed business under
his own name as successor of Nathan Winslow & Co., sold Winslow's
Green Corn and issued circulars, denying the plaintiff's right to
the name, but was enjoined from all such practices. So W. S.
Payne, after he sold his business and good will to another trades-
man, 128 was not allowed to carry on business under the old name
W. S. Payne & Co., though he could as W. S. Payne. Again, a
man, whose given name was Jacob and who sold ready made cloth-
ing, assigned his business and agreed not to use his name in com-
mercial rivalry and was held strictly to the agreement, though the
buyer of the business did not use the name. 1 2 9 When Dr. Chase
agreed not to do business as Dr. Chase's Steam Printing House nor
to sell Dr. Chase's recipes, he was enjoined from publishing any
126. Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 44 Off. Gaz. 823, Si Fed. 941. See
Hazelton v. Hazelton, X37 Ill. 231, 142 Ill. 494.
127. Symonds v. _/ones, 82 Me. 302.
128. Nothing was said as to whether the plaintiff could use the old name,
Brass, etc. Works v. Payne, 50 Ohio St. xx5; Burckhardt- v. Burckhardt,
36 Ohio St. 261; 42 Ohio St. 474.
129. Grow v. Seligman, 47 Mich. 6o7.
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recipe book so connected with his name as to lead to the inference
that it was intended to supersede the old one. 130
The man who has voluntarily parted with the right to use his
name can not recall it by carrying on business in his wife's name nor
does she by marriage acquire a higher right to use his name than he
had. 131 The maker of Halls' Vegetable Sicilian Hair Restorer sold
the good will and business and agreed not to use his name in con-
nection with similar articles and was enjoined from selling R. P.
Hall's Improved Preparation for the Hair. Hall's name had for
certain purposes a commercial value. If he estimates that value
and sells it to another, he has no further right to use it for the pur-
poses sold. 132 There is quite a remarkable group of cases in con-
nection with the right to use the name Rogers 1
3 3 in connection with
silverware and Rodgers with cutlery. Joseph Rodgers restrained
John Rodgers & Sons from marking cutlery "Rodgers," but could not
prevent them from marking it with the name of William Rodgers,
one of the sons. 13 1 In the United States, three brothers Rogers
were the first makers of electro-plated silverware and stamped their
names on the goods. 135 A number of other persons, besides their
successors, have stamped the name Rogers on silverware with vary-
ing success. Win. A. Rogers was allowed to stamp goods with his
full name and advertise them "Prices way below any Rogers goods
in the market." 136 On the other hand, D. C. Rogers, his son, and
two men named Spurr, were restrained, at the suit of Win. Rogers
& Son, from doing business as Rogers & Son. The defendant,
Rogers, had never learned silver plating, but tried to deceive pur-
chasers by using the name. Why was not the company called
Spurr & Rogers, if the intent was honest competition? '
3 7 So, when
the defendant, who had worked for complainant as a salesman,
but not as a manufacturer, organized a corporation, The R. W.
13o. Bealv. Chase, 31 Mich. 491. Defendant was not allowed to with-
draw post office order directing that letters addressed to him without residence
or private box number or word "personal" bedelivered to plaintiff. See Ken-
nedy v. Kennedy, 55 N. Y. Supp. 917.
131. Skinner v. Oakes, xo Mo. App. 45.
132. Ayer v. Hall, 3 Brewst. 509.
133. See Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Conn. 121; Goodman v. Meriden Co., 50
Conn. X39.
134. Defendant falsely used V. R. & Crown. Plaintiff was cutter to the
queen, Victoria. Rodgers v. Nowill, 6 Hare, 325, 17 Jur. N. S. 171. Nowill
employed defendant Rodgers.
x35. Int. Silver Co. v. Rogers, iio Fed. 955.
136. Rogers v. Rogers, 70 Fed. ioig. See Rogers v. Simfison, 54 Conn.
527.
137. Rogers v. Rogers &- Sfiurr, ix Fed. 495.
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Rogers Co., taking one-quarter interest therein for the use of
his name, he was enjoined from using the name and was not allowed
to put Rogers on goods. 138 A border line case, in which there was
no restraint, was one in which defendant advertised his full name
with technically accurate description, saying also "Our goods are
Rogers goods." 189 Two sons 140 of one of the original Rogers
brothers, one of whom was a farmer, and the other had been em-
ployed in the silver plating business as a laborer at $2.50 a day, with
a first cousin and two of his brothers-in-law, who had been long
with plaintiff, organized Simeon L. & Geo. H. Rogers Co., and, on
their wrappers, advertisements and labels, stated that they "were
the only real Rogers Brothers" and that their goods were the "real
Rogers goods." This was clearly designed to impress the public
with the idea that the defendant succeeded to the original firm; and
was prohibited by law, as was also the marking goods by defend-
ant with Rogers, or Rogers Brothers, with or without symbols or
initials. The name was selected from the benefit of the name Rog-
ers and not from any benefit accruing from the services -of the
brothers, who held about one-eighth of the stock. Another Rog-
ers, who was a bank clerk and never had been a silver plater, with
two men who had been in plaintiff's service, formed the Win. G. Rog-
ers Co., of which he took five per cent of the stock and was made
president. The Win. Rogers Mfg. Co. sued them and secured a
restraint from their stamping their name or that of their president
-on their goods. 141
Bernard C. Steiner.
BALTIMORE, MD.
138. Win. Rogers v. Rogers, 73 Off. Gaz. 970, 70 Fed. 1017.
139. Rogers v. Rogers, 84 Fed. 639.
i4o. Int. Silver Co. v. Rogers, iio Fed. 955; Meriden Co. v. Parker, 39
Conn. 450. Plaintiff rightfully marked goods " 1847 Rogers Bros." Defendant
bought from other Rogers the right to stamp goods "C. Rogers Bros. A. I.,
and was enjoined, not from using Rogers alone but from using Rogers Bros.
i4t. It. Silver Co. v. Rogers, 113 Fed. 526, xi8 Fed. 133.
